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1 Introduction
In order to attain waste reduction and the closing of material life cycles, the Dutch
Ministry of Environment made an attempt to sign a covenant with the producers and
importers of household appliances (the so-called white and brown goods). The
negotiations started in 1992 involving all stakeholders: representatives of the producers
and importers, the government (state, provincial and local level), the processing
industry, the retailers and the environmental organisations. But some of the issues could
not be solved and the discussions did not result in a covenant. From 1994 on,
government started to prepare for regulation on the matter. Finally, in 1998 the White
and Brown Goods Disposal Order was published. The Order arranges the producers’
responsibility regarding the disposal of white and brown goods. After publication of the
Order the sector started to develop a plan for disposal and processing of white and
brown goods. Discussions with local authorities resulted in a logistical system for
collection and disposal of the goods. As of January 1, 1999 the system has become
operational and seems to work reasonably well. In the meanwhile the sector embraced
the system, even to the point that its chairman (Coops, 2000) presents it as a product of
responsible self-regulation and co-operation with government, in an article that is
introduced as dealing with ‘the success of an environmental covenant’.
The truth is that despite lengthy negotiations, the government was not able to sign a
covenant with the white and brown goods sector. The matter - disposal of white and
brown goods - had to be arranged via regulation: the White and Brown Goods Order. In
the context of the NEAPOL project (Negotiated Environmental Agreements: Policy
Lessons to be Learned from a Comparative Case study), this paper aims to explain the
unsuccessful negotiations looking at the economic-institutional context where in the
covenant was negotiated.
Section 2 of the paper describes the setting in which the covenant was negotiated:
section 2.1 describes the development of the covenant as an instrument in Dutch
environmental policy. Section 2.2 gives a general overview of the waste problem and
describes the waste policy towards white and brown goods of the Dutch government and
the European authorities. Section 2.3 describes the specifics of the white and brown
goods sector.
Section 3 of this paper describes the negotiations for a covenant (section 3.1); the
drafting of the regulation when it became clear that a covenant was not feasible (section
3.2); and the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order (section 3.3).
The case is analysed in section 4: the results of the negotiation process are analysed in
terms of two relevant criteria of performance - feasibility, and resource development.
Finally, concluding remarks and an explanation why a covenant was not feasible in this
case are given in section 5.
22 The Case Context
2.1 Covenants as policy instrument in Dutch environmental policy
In the Netherlands more than 100 covenants have been signed between the Dutch
government and private actors.  Over the years, the covenant has become a well known
and widely used instrument in Dutch environmental policy. Based on experiences with
the instrument, it has been further developed. The first environmental covenants were
introduced in the second half of the 1980s (Glasbergen, 1998, p. 133-156).  These initial
covenants concerned only one issue; were closed between the ministry of Environment
and one actor (a company or branch organisation).  The covenant instrument fitted with
the idea of ‘internalisation’, the idea that the industry has to take its responsibility and
deal with the problems (Suurland, 1994). Within this setting, the government closed
many covenants and gradually also with more complex sectors of industry.
Key term during the nineties was the so-called target group policy (Bressers and Klok,
1996, p. 448-449). Goal of the Dutch government was to achieve a more integral
environmental policy. This target group policy was officially announced in the first
National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP, 1989) and the NEPP-plus (1990). A
fundamental principle underlying this approach is that the responsibility for reaching the
environmental targets lies primarily with the target group. In the notes that specified the
target group policy, 13 branches of trade were selected for the introduction of negotiated
agreements. Now the covenants become multiple issue involving more actors! The
involved branches of trade contain 12,000 companies, which have more than five
employees. Together they are supposed to be responsible for more than 90 per cent of
the industrial environmental burden in the Netherlands (Klok and Kuks, 1994, p. 89).
These agreements were planned to be concluded by the end of 1992. However, the
signing of the agreements was delayed, except for three branches of trade. By the end of
1997, nine of the selected branches of trade had concluded a negotiated agreement.
2.2 The waste policy
In the 1970s the Netherlands experienced an increasing shortage of space for the disposal
of waste, influenced by a steep rise in waste production, together with a threatened
exhaustion of raw materials, which led to increasing attention being paid to the re-use and
recycling of discarded products. During the 1980s, the harmful effects of materials were
increasingly the subjects of discussions between politicians and civil servants.
On the basis of historical sales figures, it has been estimated that the quantity of scrap
white and brown goods will increase from 126.5 kton in 1992 to roughly 185 kton in 2005
(Novem/RIVM, 1997). But it is not only the quantity of scrap white and brown goods that
is seen as a problem; the composition, too, is problematic. Consider, for instance, the use
of CFC as coolant and in the manufacture of insulation for refrigerators and freezers.
A serious attempt by the central government to facilitate re-use and recycling, particularly
in the white and brown goods sector, originated in 1989 in the National Environmental
Policy Plan (NEPP). In this Plan, sustainable development was to be given form by,
among other things, "closing the materials cycle in the raw materials – production process
– product – waste chain, together with the associated emissions".
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business community, as far as possible" (NEPP, 1989). Furthermore, the NEPP announced
the setting up of collection mechanisms for waste streams, such as refrigerators (inter alia
in connection with the retrieval of CFCs), electronic and electrical equipment.
In 1990 the Minister of the Environment sent a letter to the Lower House in which he
announced a re-orientation of the waste policy. In the Minister's view, the producer and the
importer should gain responsibility for their products in the disposal phase.
In the first half of 1993, the Environmental Plan 1994–1997 (NEPP, 1993) announced that
a General Administrative Order in respect of the retrieval and re-processing of
refrigerators and televisions was in preparation, and that discussions were being held with
the industry in respect of its further development. It was expected that the implementation
plan would be ready in the second half of 1993.
At the end of 1993 the Second National Environmental Policy Plan appeared (NEPP,
1993). As one of the central themes of disposal policy, it named the further detailing of the
producers' responsibility for products in the discard phase.
A year later, in the Environmental Programme 1995–1998 (TK, 1994-1995), an
announcement was made of a General Administrative Order, in preparation for mid-1995.
According to the Long-term Plan, the Order was to contain an obligation on producers and
importers to take back their own products, together with a re-processing regulation.
Furthermore, it was announced that regular discussions would be held between the parties
involved. The implementation plan was practically complete. The cabinet opted
specifically for an 'integral chain' approach by seeking to prevent the existence of waste
(prevention), and the leak-proof disposal1 of unavoidable waste. One of the important
premises here is the producer's responsibility for their products at the disposal stage.
If we follow the general policy trend, we see that the initial consensus approach to the
producers' responsibility for products in the disposal phase grew slowly into the
implementation of legislative regulation. However, the possibility of a voluntary
agreement was also kept open, virtually throughout this period.
White and brown goods
Since 1989, white and brown goods were singled out as a special (waste) category. In the
context of attempts to reduce waste and the recycling of materials, the Ministry of the
Environment attempted in 1992 to agree on a covenant with the producers and suppliers of
white and brown goods concerning the disposal of their products. In the remaining of the
paper we consider this to be the first phase of discussions about the disposal of white and
brown goods. The threat of a General Administrative Order (GAO) was retained; the
threat of legislation was supposed to put the actors under pressure to gain agreement. A
twin-track policy was pursued: the covenant and the legislation were prepared
simultaneously. The point here is that, in the absence of such a threat, there may well have
been no negotiations at all. An intense process of negotiation (1992-1994) is conducted
between all the members of the target group, the government, and third parties. The goal
of the process is not achieved; a covenant is not signed. In a second phase (1994 - 1996),
the government drafts a GAO: the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order. This Order
has gone into force on 1 January 1999. As a way out, the Order offered participation in a
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4covenant with the Ministry of the Environment. Producers and suppliers were held
responsible for the disposal of their products in the discard phase, unless they collaborated
with the government in the execution of a covenant.
European Regulation
European regulation has been in preparation for some time now. On October 9, 1997 the
environment directorate published a working paper on the issue that finally should result
in a proposal for an European directive. A fourth draft directive will be sent to the
European Commission within a few months (Directive on waste from electronics and
electronic equipment). As it looks now, the directive is in line with the Dutch policy
regarding the disposal of white and brown goods as laid down in the White and Brown
Goods Disposal Order.
2.3 The white and brown goods sector
The sector white and brown goods include the following product groups:1
1. White goods: household appliances such as freezers; refrigerators; etc.
2. Brown goods: electronic appliances for households such as televisions; video
recorders; etc.
There are only a few white goods producers in the Netherlands (Atag, Pelgrim, Schurink).
The major producers of white goods are mainly to be found in Germany, Sweden, Italy,
the United Kingdom, Spain and France. In other words, most white goods are imported
into the Netherlands. The representative body of the white goods sector is the co-operative
of producers and importers, united in the Association of Suppliers of Domestic Equipment
in the Netherlands (Vlehan). Approximately 30 businesses are incorporated into Vlehan
which is about 60 per cent of the group's total membership (mostly white goods importers
of which there are about 50 in the Netherlands). In the negotiations around the covenant
and later the regulation, Vlehan acts as a representative of the producers and importers of
white goods, and conducts negotiations in their name.
Philips and Sony have approximately the same marketshare and dictate the position
within the brown goods sector. It is important to note that the profit margins in the
electronics sector were under considerable pressure at the time the policy was being
framed (Van de Blaak, 1996: 22). In 1992, Philips, a major producer in the Netherlands,
suffered a loss of approximately 2 billion guilders. The body representing the producers
and importers of brown goods is FIAR: the Union of Manufacturers, Importers and
Agents in the electronics area (brown goods), whose membership includes a number of
major producers: Philips, Sony and JVC.  FIAR has 35 members. Philips has a big
influence on the decisions made by FIAR (Gemeentereiniging en Afvalmanagement,
4/97).
We assume that representative organisations in general well represent the general
interests of their membership. This assumption is based on Sabatier and McLaughlin
(1990). But that is not enough to fulfil the role as a representative in negotiations. The
degree to which a representative organisation is actually able to represent its
membership can furthermore be derived from the degree to which the organisation is in
a position to mobilise the resources of its membership in specific processes. Not merely
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5in the sense of supporting protest activities, but also in the sense of contributing to a
change of the target group's behaviour along the lines envisioned by the policy maker.
Vlehan's representation of the producers and importers in the negotiations appears at first
glance to be beyond dispute. At every meeting of Vlehan's management, their
representative informed the board membership of the progress. Up to a point, the target
group's members extended a mandate to the Vlehan board. The individual members did
not get involved with the decision making, allowing Vlehan to negotiate on their behalf.
At the end of the first phase of the policy formation process (in 1994), a number of the
companies that co-operated in Vlehan were however warned off by their German parent
companies, since their co-operation would only be forthcoming if a single (similar to a
German system) collection and processing system was adopted. At this point, Vlehan
withdrew (temporarily) from the negotiations, as some of its members had demanded. This
incident shows that there were clear limits to the degree that the Vlehan could thigh its
members to obligations agreed upon with the negotiating partner.
The brown goods sector was represented by FIAR during the negotiations about the
covenant. As Vlehan, FIAR had a mandate from its members to negotiate with the
government. Philips - being the largest Dutch brown goods producer - had a large
influence on the strategy played by the FIAR. Also, Philips kept direct relations/contacts
with the ministry of Economics regarding the issue of disposal of white and brown
goods.
The white and brown goods sector is a very heterogeneous sector including a wide range
of products and many international affiliations and therefore also a wide range of
interests. During the process differences in opinion arose between the sectors but also
within the sectors!  Still, throughout the process, Vlehan and Fiar were more or less on
the same side. Together the two trade associations initiated the project Appareturn to
gain insight in collection numbers and costs of disposal and processing of white and
brown goods.
3 The Process
In order to reconstruct the way that the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order was
introduced, use has been made of relevant policy documents, such as White Papers,
memoranda, and notes from the Ministries of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment and Economic Affairs. Information was also drawn from other sources, such
as newspaper and magazine articles from the period in which the Order developed. Above
all, interviews were held with experts who were involved in the policy-making process
leading to the Order. In the reconstruction of the background history of the White and
Brown Goods Disposal Order, use has also been made of the work by Megens (1996).
After reconstructing the history of development experts in the field were asked to
comment on the reconstruction.
3.1 Negotiations for a Covenant
In global terms, we can divide the process of the creation of the White and Brown Goods
Disposal Order into two phases (Megens, 1996). The phases differ in terms of the actors
involved and the degree of interaction between these actors. The high point, in terms of the
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formation process. During this phase negotiations took place in order to come to an
agreement (or covenant).  The first phase (1992 - 1994) is characterised by the existence of
a structural discussion between the actors centred on the disposal of white and brown
goods. In 1994, negotiations about a covenant ended. In the second phase (1994 - 1996)
the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order was drafted.
The actors involved from 1992 till 1994
In the first phase a great deal of discussion went on between the parties involved.  On the
side of the government and its policy formation the actors were the Ministry of Housing,
Physical Planning and Environment (VROM: full title of the Ministry of the Environment)
and, in a later phase, the Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the side of the target group
major actors are the Association of Suppliers of Domestic Equipment in the Netherlands
(Vlehan) and the Manufacturers, Importers and Agents in the electronic area (FIAR).
Further, in regard to the collection of white and brown goods, we can distinguish the retail
trade; represented by the Union of Electrotechnical Businesses (Uneto) and the
Netherlands Retail Trades Council (RND), which represents the chain stores. Further, with
regard to collection, we encounter the Netherlands Local Government Union (VNG) and
the Interprovincial Consultancy Organ (IPO). The following actors are involved from the
(re-) processing sector: The Federation for the Re-extraction of Raw Materials (FHG), the
Association of Waste Processors (VVAV) and the Recycling Business Information
Foundation (BVK, later represented by the Society of Recycling Businesses in the
Netherlands, BKN). Finally, on behalf of the interests of the general public and the
environment, the principal actors are the Consumers Union (CB), the Nature and
Environment Foundation (SNM), and the Environmental Defence Union (VMD). These
actors are also involved with each other outside the structural discussions on the disposal
of white and brown goods. Maybe not in the broad context that we see here, but together
in varying compositions. Table 1 summarises those involved in the structural discussions.
Table 1 Parties involved in the structural discussions around the creation of the
White and Brown Goods Disposal Order.
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The negotiations for a covenant: 1992 - 1994
In April 1992, Minister Alders (Environment), revealed his plans to have the purchaser of
refrigerators and freezers pay a contribution of a few tens of guilders towards the disposal
of the equipment. This was done during the opening of Coolrec, a factory in the
Netherlands for the environmentally responsible dismantling of cooling equipment so that
it may be re-used. The disposal method that Coolrec used at that time cost more than it
yielded. The money needed to bridge this gap was to come from the local authorities'
waste disposal charges. Minister Alders sought to change that. In order that the polluter
pays, he stated in 1992 that he was to send a Bill to the Lower House to institute a disposal
charge. He planned to introduce the charge in 1994.
As has been described above, the Ministry of the Environment's general policy line is in
the first instance to sign a covenant with producers on their responsibility for their own
products in the discard phase. It was this that led the Ministry to set up discussions, to be
held at four-monthly intervals, in which all those involved could negotiate on the content
of this covenant.
The Department of Domestic Waste, part of the Waste Directorate in the Ministry of the
Environment, commenced its White and Brown Goods project in 1992. In the context of
this project, the Ministry took the initiative to conduct regular discussions (every four
months) with the main parties involved in the disposal of white and brown goods. The
Ministry sent invitations to the parties involved and chaired the meetings. An external
consultancy bureau was brought in by the Ministry to support the project. Respondents
from the organisations that were present during these meetings characterised the
gatherings as a circus event because so many organisations participated in the meetings;
just stating their opinions not really responding to each other’s arguments.
The allocation of disposal costs
Major differences of opinion arose during the structural discussions between the
discussion partners. Sometimes difference occurred between the trade organisations of the
white and brown good sector on one side and the Ministry of Environment on the other
side. But also differences arose between the trade associations Vlehan and Fiar and even
within the associations conflicts occurred. The main reason for these ‘internal’ conflicts
were a difference in interests between the sectors that include a huge range of various
product groups.
The most important point of dispute concerned the introduction of a charge to cover the
costs of disposal. While nearly all those involved were agreed on the preference for a
disposal charge — on different grounds, incidentally — in advance (on purchase), FIAR
and later Vlehan, too, were against it. Vlehan and FIAR were afraid that the disposal
charge would increase prices, thus harming the producers' competitiveness against foreign
8imports. Both organisations emphasised that, if consumers and retailers were to start
purchasing goods from the surrounding countries, this would have a negative effect on
employment in the Netherlands. Vlehan and FIAR thus expressed a preference for waiting
for European regulation before introducing a disposal charge in the Netherlands. A speedy
conclusion to the negotiation process was thus not in the interests of Vlehan and FIAR.
The two organisations (certainly FIAR) appeared to be bent on delaying the process.
Various other actors, including the Environment Ministry, however, were set on a very
rapid introduction of the producers' responsibility. This led Vlehan and FIAR into
opposition, mainly with the Ministry of the Environment. In the meantime, the
Environmental Management Act was amended in order to provide a legislative context for
a possible disposal charge.
In March 1994 it appeared that Minister Alders had reached an agreement with the white
goods importers that the retrieval and re-use of the equipment they supplied should be
made compulsory from June 1995. The costs of dismantling could be passed on to the
consumers. The first plan was to introduce a charge to cover these costs, which was to
increase gradually from ten to about 65 guilders for each appaliance over several years.
The rate at which the charge was to increase depended on whether a similar charge would
be introduced in surrounding countries. Initially, the costs of disposal would largely be
born by the local authorities, but they would shift gradually in the direction of the
producers. For white goods it was agreed that, from mid-1995, the retail traders would
immediately take back old equipment when they delivered the newly purchased item. In
the meantime, the white goods sector would set up an organisation to regulate the disposal
of the apparatus they had taken back. The VNG agreed that the local authorities would
process equipment that was retrieved but not replaced.
The agreement was ready for signature in June 1994. It was at this moment that Vlehan
declared that it could no longer support the plan. In fact, Vlehan's membership had
withdrawn the organisation from the negotiations. A number of companies that
collaborated in Vlehan were warned off by their German parent companies. These parent
companies in Germany wished only to co-operate in the case that a single (similar to a
German system) collection and re-processing system was opted for. At that time it
appeared that the German government would not opt for a disposal charge, but rather for a
contribution on payment, which meant that the Dutch situation would differ from the
German one. Vlehan therefore withdrew from the negotiations, but stated that it was still
prepared to discuss matters with government and the other parties involved.
Furthermore, the Netherlands Retail Trades Council at that point objected to collection via
the retail trade. In a letter to the Minister of the Environment, the Council set down its
arguments as lack of space, possible costs, and hygiene problems. Uneto did not agree
with the Council, incidentally. Uneto believed that the retail trade should indeed assume
its responsibility for the environment by exchanging new equipment for old.
The scope of producers' responsibility
Another point on which the opinions of the different actors came to diverge was the degree
of responsibility that the producers should be allocated. The Environment Ministry wished
to have the producers accept a wide area of responsibility, making them responsible for the
entire disposal of white and brown goods. This meant that the producers would not only be
financially responsible for the processing of white and brown goods, but also for their
collection. The view of the consumer and environmental organisations was also that the
responsibility for the complete disposal of white and brown goods lay with the producers.
The Netherlands Retail Trades Council (RND) also recognised the producers'
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standpoint on collection was somewhat milder: there were possibilities for collection by
the retail trade.
Vlehan, however, was of the opinion that the government had been allocated the legal
responsibility for discarded products, including white goods, and should accept it. Also, in
view of the high processing costs, Vlehan considered that the producers only had a
responsibility for collection. In regard to collection, Vlehan was afraid that too few
discarded white goods would be collected in practice to allow them to be processed at
reasonable cost. Vlehan's opinion, furthermore, was that the producers should not bear the
costs of collection. If it were the case that producers were allocated the responsibility for
collection, then the costs would have to be covered by a disposal charge, levied on
consumers either at the time of purchase or disposal of the white and brown goods.
If, however, a general responsibility for disposal were to be allocated, then Vlehan's view
was that there could be no question of responsibility for equipment that had come onto the
market prior to the regulation. According to Vlehan, second-hand shops were selling
extremely old equipment that contained large quantities of harmful substances. Processing
such equipment would involve excessively high costs.
Neither did FIAR accept complete producer responsibility. Partial responsibility was
negotiable. In this option, FIAR took on the responsibility for the design and production
process. At the time this policy was being framed, the economic situation in the electronics
sector was very poor. The introduction of complete producer responsibility would involve
major financial consequences. Especially if the processing costs were to be incorporated
into the sales price, the consequences for the competitiveness against foreign businesses
might be very serious.
These differences of opinion between the Environment Ministry, Vlehan and FIAR peaked
in 1993, when the Economic Affairs Ministry became involved in the discussions, in an
intermediary function, as it were. The Ministry is also formally involved in the disposal of
white and brown goods, insofar as the competitiveness of the white and brown goods
sector is involved. Formally speaking, then, the Ministry also plays a part in respect of the
possible disposal charge for such goods.
At this point the Environment Ministry, possibly under the influence of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, proposed that Vlehan/FIAR should have a role in directing the disposal.
To this end, Vlehan/FIAR itself should propose a disposal plan. At that point, the
Environment Ministry had allocated responsibility for collection jointly to the local
authorities and the retail trade. However, the local authorities and the retail traders did not
agree with the director's role to be played by Vlehan. They foresaw problems with
Vlehan's involvement with their own part of the disposal – the collection of white goods.
At this point the Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs, on one side, were
in conflict with the local authorities and the retail trade on the other.
When it appeared that Vlehan's plans for the co-ordination of the disposal of white goods
did not fulfil the expectations of the Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs,
the difference of opinion slowly spread to all the actors involved. The Ministries regarded
the achievement of a covenant within a reasonable time as no longer feasible. As a result,
the structural discussions were terminated.
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3.2 Drafting the Regulation (1994–1996)
As the structural discussions between the actors in the network stranded in 1994, the
Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs decided to prepare for legislation.
The Environment Ministry actually had a draft General Administrative Order ready in the
first half of 1994. This went far further than the final General Administrative Order, as
presented in 1996. Officials from both Ministries had been in contact on this matter. Since
the Ministries could not form a common position at the official level, the draft Order was
discussed at the Ministerial level. The Ministers decided to leave the issue open for a new
cabinet.
A new cabinet assumed office. The Ministers of the Environment and Economic Affairs
offered the producers a last chance to come up with their own plans for the disposal of
white and brown goods. The plans would have to be submitted before the end of 1995, or
else it was threatened that an Order would be in place in the course of 1996.
The actors that we have seen in the previous phase no longer appear in the same
composition in the negotiations in the present phase. Two networks can be distinguished
in the negotiation that was conducted in this phase of the policy formation. In the first
place, there were repeated discussions on the disposal of white and brown goods between
the Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs, and Vlehan and FIAR. Outside
this process, the Ministries contacted Vlehan and FIAR separately on other matters. In this
phase the other actors initially had no contact with each other on the disposal of white and
brown goods. In a later stage of this phase of policy formation (1996), discussions were
held between VNG, NVRD, HBD, the Consumers Union, the Nature and Environment
Foundation (SNM), the Environmental Defence Union (VMD), Uneto and, later, BKN on
the disposal of white goods. These discussions were intended to influence the content of
the Order, which had by then been announced.
When it appeared that, in view of the wide differences of opinion, a covenant was scarcely
feasible within a reasonable time, the Ministry of the Environment initiated preparations
for legal regulation. Many of the actors involved in the first phase were looking forward to
legislation with pleasure, in view of the long drawn out negotiating process. It was mainly
the Consumers Union; the environmental organisations and the retail trade that found that
the process had gone on long enough; they wanted a speedy regulation of the producers'
responsibility for white and brown goods. The various actors were in large measure
unanimous about a policy instrument in the form of legal regulation. Only Vlehan and
FIAR did not fit in with these unified objectives, since they rejected any form of producer
responsibility, other than in a European context.
One point on which there was still a difference of opinion between the actors related to the
content of the General Administrative Order in preparation. The Environment Ministry,
which had in the first instance declared itself to be in favour of the incorporation of
environmental criteria1 in the regulation, now abandoned these demands for the reason
that the Ministry -as the other parties- did not have insight into collection numbers. A
number of organisations (with HBD as the principal and co-ordinating actor) acquainted
the Economic Affairs Minister with their concerns on this point, among others, in June
1996. In a letter, HBD, Uneto, RND, CB, SNM, NVRD, VNG and VMD emphasised the
importance of a rapid introduction of a far-reaching producer responsibility, together with
the incorporation of environmental criteria into the plans. The letter went on to emphasise
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that there was a wide area of support for the environmentally responsible disposal of white
goods.
In 1995 Vlehan and FIAR started a pilot collection project, called Appareturn (Apparetour
in Dutch), in the Eindhoven area. The project was supported by financial contributions
from the Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs, among others. The project
was to give the sector a better insight into costs of disposal and the degree to which
obsolete equipment could actually be re-used. Furthermore, Vlehan and FIAR wanted to
see whether collection projects would deliver sufficient equipment, after German pilot
projects had appeared to show that little used equipment was being returned. They wanted
to wait for the pilot project's results before negotiating with the Ministries about a national
introduction. According to the agreement with the Ministries, the pilot project was to run
to the end of 1996. Neither of the Ministries agreed to this, however. In June 1995, the
Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs wrote a letter to the producers and
importers co-operating in Vlehan, informing them that they had to present a declaration of
intent before 1 July, in which they were to make clear their views on product disposal.
Thereafter, before 1 November of the same year, they were to come up with concrete
solutions. While a declaration of intent was in fact signed, the 1 November ultimatum
passed without the submission of any concrete plans for the regulation of retrieval and re-
processing. The producers and importers finally submitted their plans at the end of 1995.
At first sight, Minister De Boer (Environment) regarded the plans as acceptable: "They
offer sufficient perspective to be incorporated into legislative regulation".
The RND reacted to the plans of Vlehan and FIAR with disappointment. In RND's view,
the proposals to the Ministry embraced only a very limited form of producer
responsibility. In the main, it was the responsibilities of the other actors, such as the
retail trade, that was set out. The Council informed Vlehan that the key role in the area
of physical collection is reserved for the local authorities, in the context of their legal
responsibility to take care of consumer waste. The retail trade is prepared to assume a
number of tasks within such a physical structure, if that were to lead to discarded white
goods being disposed of in an environmentally unobjectionable manner (RND, 1996).
After further study of the plans submitted in December 1995, the Ministry of the
Environment sent a letter to the suppliers in April 1996, in which it indicated that "the
plans as submitted, in particular as these concern consumer goods, do not yet offer
sufficient perspectives for the realisation of an adequate disposal structure. This has led to
the Ministers', ..., decision to adopt legislation. This legislation will be very limited in
scope, leaving as much room as possible for self-regulation." The letter furthermore made
it clear that the producers and importers of white goods would be allocated a directing
function (via their branch organisations) for the creation of a disposal structure.
"Producers and importers shall agree with other involved parties on their role."
In the interim, the Eindhoven pilot project was still running. The environmental movement
stated that the meagre results of the pilot project (in their view) suited the producers. As a
counter-activity, the Environmental Defence Union (VMD) organised a collection, to last
for three days at the end of 1996. According to the Union's figures, this three-day
campaign resulted in an equal quantity of equipment being collected as the Appareturn
project had managed in eight months.
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The policy forming actors in the process leading to the White and Brown Goods Disposal
Order were the Ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs. The actors
attempted to formulate a joint policy on the disposal of white and brown goods. The
policy's target group is formed by the producers and importers of white and brown goods
in the Netherlands. In the policy formation process surrounding the disposal of white
goods, Vlehan and FIAR represented the target group. During the first phase in the
formation of the policy, these organisations also participated in the structural discussions
organised by the Environment Ministry. Other participants in these discussions were the
representatives of lower tiers of government (IPO and VNG) and the Dutch retail trade
(Uneto and RND, in connection with the collection; representatives of the waste
processing sector (FHG, VVAV, BVK); and the Consumers Union and environmental
organisations (SNM and VMD) as representatives of consumer and environmental
interests. Major conflicts arose during the negotiations on a covenant regarding the
disposal of white and brown goods. The ministry of Economics was in an intermediary
position and did not agree with the ‘full‘ producer responsibility proposed by the
Environment and others. The trade associations were reluctant to take responsibility for
the waste products: they did not consider this to be their problem. Within the sector also
major differences in opinion existed regarding the disposal issue. The fact that especially
the brown goods sector had great difficulties at that time due to a bad economic
performance in the sector and heavy competition also created an atmosphere that was not
ideal for coming to an agreement. Clearly, the trade associations operated a strategy of
delay by: keeping discussions going and not taking decisions; wanting to wait for the
results of the Appareturn project; and wanting to wait for European regulation. One
uniform European regulation was attractive to them because (1) this would avoid
distortion of competition in Europe and (2) this would create one uniform disposal system
in Europe for the producers instead of having to adapt to different systems in different
countries. At the same time, the sector did not participate heavily in European for a to
influence European policy making. It seems that the forthcoming EU regulation was used
in discussions to delay decision taking.
In the second phase of the policy formation process, Vlehan and FIAR were also involved
in negotiations with the policy makers, in a small circle. The other actors played a less
important part in this phase. They stated their objections and interests to the policy makers.
Now the policymakers - the Ministries of Environment and Economics were on the same
side, having the same goal: establishing a system for the disposal and processing of white
and brown goods.
3.3 The outcome: the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order
The draft General Administrative Order – the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order as
drafted by the Ministries of Environment and Economic Affairs in the course of 1996 – is
an outline regulation. The final order was published on April 21, 1998. The main elements
of the Order are the following:
- Producers and importers of white and brown goods are responsible for the disposal and
processing of white and brown goods. Therefore they have to set up a disposal structure
which is free of leaks and organise for an environmentally friendly processing of these
goods.
- A prohibition (ban) to incinerate or dumping of white and brown goods
- A prohibition on the trade in freezers that contain CFCs
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- The retailer has to take in the old product from the consumers for free when a new
product is bought (old for new system). The retailer can bring the old products to the local
authorities or give it to the producers/importers.
- The municipality has to collect the white and brown goods separately. And they have to
take in the old products from the retailers without charging them for this service (which is
normally the case when it concerns industrial waste). In addition, the municipalities are
responsible for the collection and processing of old products of which the
producer/importer does not exist anymore.
The producers and importers of white and brown goods have to inform the minister how
they intend to fulfil their obligations concerning the disposal of the goods before
September 1, 1998. The Order offers three ways to do this:
- The producers and importers can make individual plans (an individual announcement to
the minister).
- The producers and importers can make a joint plan (a collective announcement).
- They can close a covenant with the government that then discharges them from the
obligations in the Order.
It is striking that the order still offered the option for a covenant although it is not a real
advantage anymore (not for the government and not for the sector) since the order requires
the same elements as a collective or individual announcement. There is a difference in
regulatory sense: a covenant makes all partners responsible for the implementation; the
Order holds the government responsible for the implementation. According to a
respondent of the Environment Ministry, the option has been included under pressure of
the ministry of Economics who wanted to keep the option of a covenant open.
The sector didn’t make use of the covenant option. The FIAR and the Vlehan submitted a
joint plan - a collective announcement - before the deadline was passed. The plan was for
a large part based on the experience with the pilot project Appareturn in Eindhoven. The
plan described the disposal structure for white and brown goods and included among
others:
- Collection scheme for the appliances
- Percentages for re-use of products and materials
- Finance system
- Monitoring system for the disposal structure
The FIAR and Vlehan together include about 80 % or the total market of the producers
and importers of white and brown goods. Those that are not member of Vlehan or FIAR
can join this collective initiative.
The Dutch government approved the plans submitted by the Vlehan and FIAR. However,
this didn’t mean that the removal and processing of disposed white and brown goods was
effective. For the system to become operational, an agreement had to be reached between
the other players in this field: most importantly the local authorities who - on basis of the
Order - are responsible for those appliances that have been brought on the market by
producers and importers that are not active anymore (the so-called ‘verweesde apparaten’).
In addition, the industry and the local authorities had to come to an agreement on the
logistical system.  Especially the cost item (who will pay for what) made the discussions
difficult.
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The producers and importers of white (Vlehan) and brown (FIAR) goods created a new
organisation - the NVMP 1 - that was made responsible for organising the disposal and
processing of white and brown goods. The local authorities were represented by the
NVRD.2   The discussions regarding the collection of white and brown goods took place
between the NVMP and the NVRD.
One month before the system had to be effective (January 1, 1999) an agreement was
reached between the NVMP and the NVRD. It was decided to use existing regional
stations (the so-called ROS, in Dutch: Regionaal Overslag Station) as the central point for
handing over the disposed white and brown goods to the industry.  At the ROS of which
there are 50 spread out over Holland, the appliances coming from the consumers and the
retail will be collected and divided in different product groups. The NVMP will take care
of the goods from the ROS on. The NVMP will pay the ROS a handling fee.
To finance the whole system, the consumers pay a separate sum (a so-called ‘disposal
contribution’, in Dutch: verwijderingsbijdrage) that is added to the price of the product.
The sum have been set for each product type separately and is based on the expected costs
of processing. The retailers have to administrate this amount separately so that it can be
transferred to a fund that will be used to pay the costs of collection and processing.
The Dutch government decided to lay down the producer responsibility in a general order
after it became clear that a covenant was not feasible. The order determines the general
responsibilities of the various players in this field. The industry is given the task to set up a
system for collection and processing of the disposed white and brown goods. The sector
organisations -Vlehan and FIAR- set up a separate organisation – NVMP - that developed
a plan for collection and processing. The plans were sent to the government before the
deadline had passed and were approved by the authorities. Now a new round of
discussions started between the actors that play a role in the collection system and which
had to co-ordinate their actions: the local authorities, the retailers and the producers and
importers. The RVND (on behalf of the local authorities) and the NVMP reach an
agreement on logistics and costs in December 1998. On January 1, 1999 the collection and
processing of disposed white and brown goods has become effective. Respondents at the
ministries of Environment and Economics state that they are satisfied with the final
outcome: a collective disposal system in which local authorities, the retail trade and the
producers co-operate. The system has been effective from January 1, 1999. Due to the
short preparation period (in December an agreement was reached between RNVD and
NVMP), the implementation of the system shows some deficiencies in the beginning but
is now working reasonably well. The sector even has become proud of it,  even to the
point that its chairman (Coops, 2000) presents it as a product of responsible self-
regulation and co-operation with government, in an article that is introduced as dealing
with ‘the success of an environmental covenant’.
4 Analysis of the case
Since the negotiations did not result in an agreement it is only possible to look at part of
the performance of the covenant. Taking our theoretical framework as a starting point,
                                                          
1 NVMP: the Dutch Association for Disposal of Metal Electronic Appliances
2 Branche organisation of the waste collection departments of the local authorities
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we can conclude that we can only assess the feasibility and the resource development
aspect of the performance.
Feasibility
Although initially all actors preferred to sign a covenant, in the end a covenant was not
feasible mainly due to opposing objectives and a lack of willingness to compromise. As
we have seen, the primary objective of both the Ministries of Environment and of
Economic Affairs was an extension of producer responsibility (although the ministry of
Environment wanted to go further in this respect than the ministry of Economic Affairs),
whereby the costs of disposal would have to be born by the producers. They may pass
these costs on to the consumer.
Insofar as the disposal of white goods did not fall to the account of the suppliers, and thus
did not necessitate the introduction of a nation-wide price increase, the sector
(producers/importers) was prepared to negotiate on the disposal of white goods.1 While
they were willing to consider disposal, and seek to contribute to a solution, the sector
wished to avoid incurring the costs. The position of the sector was also determined by the
foreign offices: the sector in the Netherlands mainly consists of importers, the producers
are located outside the Netherlands. These foreign producers were kept informed of the
negotiations and also had influence in the position that the Vlehan took in the negotiations.
When, during the negotiations on a possible covenant, the conflicting views of the sector
and the policy makers collided, the sector withdrew (temporarily) from the negotiations.
Apart from objectives concerning the content of the measures, we also have to consider
here the various objectives concerning the process. The Ministry of the Environment and
the other actors were concerned that the producer's responsibility should not be postponed
but introduced as quickly as possible. Vlehan and FIAR, however, were bent on delaying
the introduction of national regulation. Such a delay would give Vlehan/FIAR the
advantage that a regulation might possibly be introduced on the European level, or that
one might come into view.
The resulting situation consists of a failed attempt to sign a covenant and later on a
regulation that however still has some remaining elements that make negotiation based
elaboration possible. All in all we assess the performance as “non feasible”.
Capability, Impact and Resource Development
Since no covenant was signed in the end, we can not assess its capability and impact. The
negotiations did not result in a covenant. However, as we have seen the negotiations
continued in a somewhat smaller group. The subject was the same: the disposal of white
and brown goods. The instrument was different: not a covenant but regulation. It might be
interesting to see if and how the negotiations on a covenant strengthen or weakened the
resource base for the further discussions on the regulation.
The development of the resource base can be looked at from three perspectives:
Learning: During the negotiations many questions and issues came up regarding the
disposal and processing of white and brown goods. An answer was not always available.
The issues were among others: the extent of the producer responsibility; question of how
to finance the system; question of how to deal with the equipment of which the
producer/importer does not operates at the market anymore. In this context, the
negotiations provided a forum for discussing these issues and learning about possible
solutions.
                                                          
1 The financial problem involves in particular the disposal of the (obsolete) CFC-containing refrigerators and
freezers.
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Building relationships: The first phase of the negotiations (1992-1994) involved many
organisations. In interviews, participants referred to these meetings as ‘circus events’ and
complained that the meetings were too big in order to be productive. On the one hand, the
meetings established communication lines between all that had a stake in the issue. On the
other hand you can question the quality of these relations. The discussions taking place in
smaller circles involving the ministries and trade associations had more impact on building
relationships.
Improving general awareness and attitudes: Interviews with and articles by
representatives of the two key organisations, Vlehan and FIAR, clearly show that the
sector was not prepared to take responsibility for their products in the final, disposal phase.
In interviews (Milieumagazine 12-98, Magazine recycling Benelux nr. 1-1999) Vlehan
still argued that the disposal and processing of consumergoods is a responsibility of the
(local) authorities and not a responsibility of the sector. At the same time, the sector – once
the regulation was published in April 1998 – took up the implementation in a progressive
way. In October 2000 an interview with the chair of  VLEHAN was published in an
practitioners’ journal  in which the introduction of the writer suggested that it was a
successful covenant and the interviewee suggests that it was the product of co-operative
negotiations with the Ministry, presents is as obvious that the sector feels itself responsible
for a well functioning system and proudly claims that the ‘Dutch approach’ is influential in
shaping the European regulation (Coops, 2000).
5 Conclusions
Since 1989, white and brown goods were singled out as a special (waste) category in
Dutch environmental policy. In the context of attempts to reduce waste and the recycling
of materials, the Ministry of the Environment attempted in 1992 to agree on a covenant
with the producers and suppliers of white and brown goods concerning the disposal of
their products. An intense process of negotiation (1992-1994) is conducted between all the
members of the target group, the government, and third parties. The goal of the process is
not achieved; a covenant is not signed. In a second phase (1994 - 1996), the government
drafts a GAO: the White and Brown Goods Disposal Order. This Order has gone into
force on 1 January 1999. The sector has set up a system for the disposal of white and
brown goods in co-operation with the local authorities.
Several factors explain why a covenant was not feasible in this case concerning the
disposal of white and brown goods. Of the hypotheses with which this study started out,
two were rejected on the basis of the case analyses.
The competition hypothesis seems to suppose another context than that of a complete
sector negotiating with government, leaving no consumer choice to evade possibly bad
environmental behaviour within the domestic market.
In the case of the instrumental hypothesis the relationship with this case is somewhat
mixed. Although the threat of alternative policy instruments, namely regulation, was
present, this didn’t push the negotiations towards a covenant. The explanation lies in the
position of the Dutch government during the negotiations and in the fact that at another
policy level, the European level, regulation was in preparation. This ‘alternative policy
instrument’ didn’t act as a threat, but instead as a sign of hope for the sector negotiators,
making then prone to delay rather than accept any agreement. So it is difficult to say to
what extent the hypothesis failed or is confirmed in this case.
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Two other hypotheses about the explanation of the feasibility of a negotiated agreement
in this case were supported by the case description.
The policy hypothesis stresses the importance of a climate of consensus seeking and
mutual trust. In this case, the lack of a real climate of consensus seeking and joint
problem solving during the negotiations has played an important role in the outcome
that a covenant was not feasible. The case supports the hypothesis.
The sectoral hypothesis is also confirmed. Within the sector differences in opinion
existed on the issues discussed, since the interests of the sectors differed, due to
heterogeneity. The power of the representative associations over their members was
limited. Their mandate to compromise with government on behalf of the sector was
restricted, among others due to the involvement of the foreign producers.
Partly as a background for these conclusions and partly as additional explanations the
following observations deserve notion here.
Firstly a joint problem perception on the basis of which a sense and acceptance of
inevitability could raise, was lacking in this case. The producers and importers of white
and brown goods - did not consider the waste coming from ‘their’ goods as their
problem. The authorities in the Netherlands had always been responsible for the disposal
of household waste and this wasn’t to change in their opinion. They certainly did not
agree with the principle of producer responsibility that was a key issue in the
discussions.
Secondly the sector didn’t see these negotiations as possibly leading to new joint
business opportunities. Instead they saw such opportunities better warranted by a
European regulation that would place them in the same position as their international
competitors, but also as their foreign mother companies. Instead of looking for
compromises or solutions to the problems, the sector operated a strategy of delay
arguing that they wanted to wait for European regulation on the matter.
Thirdly, though the negotiations failed, nevertheless some positive learning occurred
making the drafting of formal regulation thereafter more feasible. In that sense the
negotiations have had an important information resource building function.
Fourthly, when the sector was forced by a regulation to pick up its responsibility, it not
only did so, but even tries to present its efforts as belonging to the main stream of Dutch
co-operative covenant-based policy implementation. Also the relationship with
European regulation seems to be turned around. The Dutch approach is claimed to have
a big impact on the formulation of the European regulation.
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